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SUPREME COURT ROUNDTABLE: FOGERTY V. FANTASY,
INC.1 AND CAMBPELL V. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC.
2
EDITORS' NOTE:
The following is a transcript of a roundtable discussion held on April
11, 1994. The discussion was hosted by Roger L. Zissu, a partner at Weiss
Dawid Fross Zelnick & Lehrman, P.C., then President of the Copyright
Society. The participants were Marcia B. Paul, a partner at Kay Collyer &
Boose; Irwin Karp, counsel for many years to the Authors' League and
currently counsel to the Committee for Literary Property Studies; Robert
M. Callagy, a partner at Satterlee Stephens Burke & Burke; Professor of
Law Marci Hamilton, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity; Frank R. Curtis, a partner at Rembar & Curtis; Bernard Sorkin,















two recent Supreme Court decisions in the copyright area,
the Fogerty v. Fantasy case and then Campbell v. Acuff Rose
Music, Inc. My name is Roger Zissu. I may say various
things which express my views, but may not, and they may
be provocative and they may be to stimulate the discussion.
We cannot quote you in the future on anything you say
here, because you may have said it simply to be provocative
and promote discussion.
Correct, you can quote me.
Anyway it works, we are going to quote you.
Roger.
Yes.
I guess I should warn you...
Yes.
... that we are going to transcribe this and print it in the
Journal of the Copyright Society.
Correct.
But everybody will have a chance to edit their remarks
before we do that.
1 510 U.S. -, 127 L. Ed. 455, 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
2 510 U.S. -, 127 L. Ed. -, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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Zissu You can quote me. I am just saying some of my questions
will not reflect my views. It probably will be apparent, but
anyway, why don't we go forward on the Fogerty case. Let
me start off by asking, who was surprised by the result of
this case and why?
Sorkin I was not surprised, I agree with the result but I have a
question about its application. But I will leave that for later
and let you put your question to the others around here.
Karp I wasn't surprised, but I didn't think it was that sure a thing.
I think that the Court had to consider the Second Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit's longstanding preference for plaintiff
recovery and I think they came out with the right result.
Callagy I would echo Irwin's conclusion. I tried a case recently-a
copyright infringement case-where the jury awarded plain-
tiff $1.00 but when it came to the application for attorneys'
fees plaintiff's counsel sought $212,000. Now, certainly
Fogerty would not preclude the application for attorneys'
fees, but it underscored the fact that an award should be
discretionary on both sides.
Zissu Is it that the Fourth Circuit was right all along? The Fourth
Circuit said, and that is quoted in the opinion, that all the
other Courts, like the Second and the Ninth, made some-
thing out of nothing. Wasn't this discretionary for all the
Circuits all along, and isn't that what the statute says?
Paul I think that the Supreme Court is saying that yes, of course,
it is discretionary and has always been. But they are saying
something other than what the Fourth Circuit has said, by
stating that the same standard needs to be applied within
that discretion to both plaintiffs and defendants.
Hamilton The problem with that account of the case, though, is that
they give absolutely no guidance on the criteria for such
discretion. They say it's an equitable set of considerations
and, as we know from all the fair use cases, equitable sets of
considerations can't occupy the entire universe. So I don't
think it is at all clear after this case, who will get attorneys'
fees and who won't. It will be difficult to predict whether
you should bring the suit or not.
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Curtis I think you are jumping ahead now, from the question of
surprise to the substance of it, but I think that's a very apt
observation. As far as how to reach the decision, obviously
questions of culpability, bad faith, objective unreasonable-
ness, are very relevant, but the Court does not say very
much. It leaves us rather in the open about what comes into
play beyond that. If you don't have a very clear case of bad
faith or unreasonableness, the balance isn't clearly on one
side or the other. The Court isn't saying that those are the
only considerations, but they say rather little about what
other considerations should be brought into play.
Paul What other statutes which provide for an award attorneys'
fees are you aware of, where the Court has stepped in and
spelled out the parameters of that discretion?
Curtis I don't think I can speak to that, maybe others can.
Zissu I think maybe one thing we could say is that we do have a
history of fee awards in the copyright area and we do have
one standard with the prevailing party. And plaintiffs, as
prevailing parties, frequently, I won't say automatically,
recover reasonable attorney's fees and maybe that may
happen with defendants. The courts are going to have to
define this. I am not sure we can ask the Supreme Court to
do that.
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Curtis I think there will be a somewhat greater tendency to award
fees to plaintiffs even after this case, because if you take out
the cases where there is a clear imbalance, somebody was
clearly acting out of a bad motive, somebody was clearly
wrong, and think about whether there are any cases that are
more closely balanced in which there should be an award of
attorneys' fees, I think it is easier to summon up considera-
tions in cases where plaintiff prevails, than where the
defendant prevails. Despite the Court's emphasis on the fact
that it's supposed to be an even handed rule, I think there
may still be little greater tendency to award fees to
prevailing plaintiffs. And I don't think that's necessarily a
wrong thing, because what I keep returning to in my own
mind is the fact that, in at least most cases, the defendant is
the party that has done something that is being objected to,
the defendant is the one who had the opportunity to decide
how close to the line he was going to go. And I think there
is some merit in saying that maybe that factor should be
taken into account when you get to an award of fees. The
plaintiff didn't have a chance to say "keep a little farther
away from the line." It was the defendant's choice, to some
extent, to take the risk that he would be found wrong if he
got too close to the line.
Sorkin May I ask a question? Mr. Curtis has listed a number of
elements that might be taken into consideration, presumably
even handedly on both sides. Would another element, do
you think, be the relative economic standing of the two
parties?
Paul I don't think it should be, do you?
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Karp I think we have to read a footnote, unfortunately. At the
very end of the opinion, the Court says, quoting from
Hensley v. Eckerhart, "there is no precise rule for making
these determinations. Equitable discretion should be exer-
cised in the light of considerations we have identified."
(Footnote 19.) Then they refer to Lieb v. Topstone Indus-
tries, a Third Circuit 1986 decision, pointing out that in Lieb
the Third Circuit listed several non-exclusive factors that the
courts should consider in making awards of attorneys' fees
to any prevailing party: "These include 'frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness... and, the need in
particular circumstances, to advance considerations of com-
pensation and deterrence.'" And the other factors in Lieb
include, and I'm reading from Lieb now at 788 F.2d at 156.
Is that okay, Roger?
Zissu That's okay. It's not only okay, it's impressive.
Karp "Having decided that fees should be awarded, the District
Court must then determine what amount is reasonable: "As
we noted in Chappel"-I'm not going to cite that one,
Roger- "the relative complexity of the litigation is relevant.
Also a sum greater than what the client has been charged
may not be assessed, but the award need not be that large.
The relative financial strength of the parties is a valid
consideration." There are citations for all of these. In
keeping with your observation, or cases, I had to point this
out. "The relative financial strength is a valid consideration
as are the damages when bad faith is present. That too may
affect the size of the award."
Hamilton The problem with that listing, though, is the fact that the
Supreme Court decided not to list any of these particular
factors you just read. The Court leaves us in the dark.
Karp Oh no! The Court said in the footnote, we agree that such
factors may be used "to guide the courts' discretion," so
long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the
Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing claimants and
defendants in an even-handed manner.
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Callagy The problem I have that is the list of factors you have just
reviewed, Irwin, is more in line with the conduct penalized
under Rule 11 where you brought a case either in bad faith
or where you knew you had no claim. But when a plaintiff
wins, just by being the prevailing party, without more,
plaintiff often receives an award of counsel fees. This litany
of reasons why a party gets attorneys' fees does not simply
say, "you're the winner or the loser," you've got to show
much more. I guess I have a problem with that, because I
think that a defendant will have a tough time receiving an
award to the extent that you rely on the factors included on
the list.
Karp Bernie's employer was a defendant in an infringement suit
called Denker v. Uhry and Time Warner. Henry Denker, a
very prolific novelist and a fairly successful playwright who
had four good plays on Broadway, was convinced that
Alfred Uhry had stolen "Driving Miss Daisy" from a play of
Henry's which ran a week on Broadway-called "Horowitz
and Mrs. Washington." In fact, I looked at the two. He
didn't retain me, but he asked my opinion. I looked at the
two, and I wrote him a short note. I said you cannot
copyright boy meets girl-boy loses girl-boy gets girl-;
the only similarities between these two plays are that in
both, one protagonist is white and the other one is black
and they don't like each other, the black helps the white,
and after a while they get friendly. That's what the judge
decided. It was argued on appeal a few months ago. The
argument was at 11:00 and at 2:00 the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals called Henry's attorney and said we have a decision
for you-affirmed. It took the Court of Appeals probably
only five minutes to do it, not even the three hours. I
looked at that and I wondered, now, how is he going to get
away without paying attorneys' fees? Now, I don't know
why...
Zissu Second Circuit?
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Karp Second Circuit. I would have still moved, even under the
Second Circuit rules. This case had so little merit, that I'm
sure the Second Circuit would have awarded attorneys' fees.
Anyway, by now I thought we'd all learned the Second
Circuit is a lousy copyright court. You want to start ticking
off all of the Second Circuit opinions that the Supreme
Court has reversed in the copyright field. A whole string of
them. My assumption is that in a case where the plaintiff's
contention was so tenuous, that you would ask for attorneys'
fees even in light of the decision, and they didn't. And in
answer to you, Bob, is that I think one of the reasons that
we haven't had more effective application of attorneys' fees,
a lot of lawyers don't ask for them when they should.
Zissu Don't you think the Court should now award attorneys' fees
in that kind of case? In other words, it's not necessarily
frivolous or in bad faith, but it's objectively without merit.
It's over the borderline.
Karp Yes, I think they should.
Zissu Don't you think that it's a little bit of a message that the
Supreme Court is sending, and it may have to do with
docket control and being anti-litigation?
Curtis I'm going to start. I think undoubtedly they are sending the
message, but I think there is also some validity to the point
made before. In thinking about going forward with litiga-
tion, whether you litigate something or don't litigate it, what
does this decision do to the calculus of litigating or not?
And I suggest that, except in those very strong cases, where
one side is very clearly in the right, this case will tend to
eliminate a consideration of attorneys' fees, except perhaps
as a wild card in the sense that there is so much discretion,
it's so hard to tell in advance of the case, except where the
merits are really clear, how a court is going to assess those
equities, that I think you will tend to throw it in the air and
say, "Well, I can't really come to grips with that question,
except for the fact that it just increases the general
uncertainties of litigating anything."
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Paul I think that we are all focusing, at least implicitly, on the
idea that it might discourage plaintiffs with borderline cases,
which is the whole reason that the American legal system
does not provide for automatic award of attorneys fees to
the prevailing party absent statutory authorization. But I
think, from my own experiences in practice, it may have
another quite the opposite effect. In representing publishers
many times, they settle as defendants rather than spend the
amount of money on attorneys' fees that would be involved
in litigating the point. I believe that certain of the
publishers may, if they believe that there is a realistic chance
of getting attorneys' fees at the end of the day-which
involves not just consideration of whether the same standard
is applied, but also the deepness of the pocket involved-
may tend to fight more things as a matter of principle rather
than enter routine settlements which might affect their
insurance premiums or their legal budgets. So I think it
could cut two ways.
Jones It seems to me in a similar manner, however, that it reduces
the chance that a plaintiff with a meritorious claim will feel
confident that attorneys' fees will be available at the end of
the day. Thus, one might see a reduction in the number of
plaintiffs who bring suits. If you can't calculate what the
discretion is about, you may end up being most unwilling to
bring the suit.
Karp If those factors will come into play, they have already been
in play in some of the circuits anyway, where they have
applied the even handed approach. I don't know that you
could do a test to find that there is less litigation there or
unmeritorious claims than any other circuits.
Zissu It would be interesting.
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Curtis To the extent that this change discourages meritorious
claims, I think that one thing that should be thought about
is further increasing the provisions we have for statutory
damages. They finally doubled them recently, but they are
still, especially in non-willful cases, rather small numbers.
Maybe that's a way to deal with it rather than dealing with
it through attorneys' fees, because the case in which this
becomes the most critical problem is where you have the
plaintiff who thinks he has a good case, maybe not black
and white, but very good case, but where the damages are
comparatively modest, and if he can be pretty sure he's
going to get attorney's fees, maybe it's worth proceeding
with, but if he's not so sure about that, it isn't worth it.
Those caps that we have on such statutory damages, I think,
are perhaps too modest.
Sorkin Isn't it likely that a court would apply very similar
discretionary factors to the range of the amount of statutory
damages to be awarded? You'll find yourself right back
where you started from in that sense, won't you?
Curtis Yes and no. I don't think that that's entirely true. I think
that in view of the Court's decision, if it wasn't a strong
case, one way or another, I could easily imagine the Court
denying the attorneys' fees and yet, if it were permitted,
allowing a more substantial award of statutory damages.
Paul But the lack of predictability in terms of the parameters and
standards remains.
Callagy Roger, I just wanted to pick up on one point that you made
and that is, maybe the potential for attorneys' fees is aimed
at trying to speed up the Court docket. There is a provision
in the federal rules which permits an offer of judgment
where you are defending a case you don't think is worth a
great deal where you can offer an amount of judgment, and
if the plaintiff doesn't pick the offer up, then they don't get
costs. But in some cases where there is an offer of judgment
they don't get attorneys' fees either. However, in the
copyright arena, they still may receive attorneys' fees. I
guess it all comes down to who is the prevailing party and
will Fogerty serve as a deterrent?
236 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
Zissu Taking Marcia's idea that some publishers might now fight it
as a matter of principle, it is also possible, is it not, that they
might fight and after a year or two, when a couple of them
have won, then maybe some of the misguided litigation
might subside somewhat. What do you people think about
that?
Paul I think that that might be a real salutary effect-and I'm
sure the insurance community in this country would be very
glad if that would happen-but I think that if more
publishers assert themselves and aren't seen as a "soft
touch" by plaintiffs, there may well be, over time, a decrease
in the amount of suits, even apart from the availability of
attorneys' fees. I just had a question for Bob Calagy; I
didn't understand something you said. Are you saying that
if you've made an offer of judgment under the Federal
Rules as they now stand, and that offer is not accepted, and
if at the end of the day your recovery is the same or less
than the amount offered, you cannot recover attorneys fees?
Are you saying that because of the Copyright Act, even
given the discretion of the judge, there is a different rule?
Callagy The courts have been awarding attorneys' fees despite an
offer of judgment.
Karp And an award coming in below the offer?
Callagy Correct.
Zissu One of the ways you can sometimes deal with that is in your
offer of judgment, you put in a provision relating to
attorneys' fees. I've had that experience. It has been
helpful to me.
Karp Roger, one thing that people should keep in mind when
they start writing law review articles or doing surveys about
this, is that attorneys' fees are far from unusual in federal
court. I always thought that-having read some of the
literature (in particular, the propaganda from publishers on
section 412) that this is an extraordinary remedy, and in
violation of the American rule. But the U.S. Code is full of
federal statutes which provide for the award of attorneys'
fees and statutory damages. The Copyright Act is far from
unique, so that there is a whole body of law and case law
that has to be looked at in order to test some of these
assumptions we're making. It isn't a phenomenon confined
to copyright law.
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Hamilton Except for the fact that this case proves that all of that
existing case law is not necessarily going to be determinative
in a copyright context. This case is all about why attorneys'
fees will be considered differently than when they are
considered, for instance, in the Title 7 context.
Karp Yes, but that was because of the legislative history to Title 7.
Hamilton Thus, the existing attorneys' fees case law is not going to
provide much guidance in the copyright context. The
footnote that you were reading earlier ended with the quote
that we're not going to use those Third Circuit criteria
necessarily. We're only going to use them if they are
consistent with the policies of the Copyright Act, whatever
those are.
Karp I agree, but the range of statutory damage and attorneys'
fees provisions goes beyond the civil rights cases where they
have the element of a private attorney general being
encouraged to bring suits. They're in all sorts of statutes.
Paul I think we are also forgetting, or at least not paying enough
attention to the fact, that our federal judges, for the reasons
that Irwin just stated, and as a general proposition, are
conducting fee hearings all of the time, and they are used to
dealing with "lodestar" approaches, "vexatious" standards
and all the other factors. There are some factors which are
peculiar to copyright cases. But, by and large, we're talking
about a range of discretion based on novelty of issues,
relative strength and weakness of the parties-the same
kinds of standards which were applied in federal court
virtually every day by virtually every judge.
Hamilton My problem with that is two fold: One, is that I don't know
what the policies of the Copyright Act are. It's an amalgam
of compromises, and you can't find one single policy that
will inform you how to determine or how to assign
attorneys' fees in any particular case. But that's the
standard the Court provides: courts are supposed to apply
the policies of the Copyright Act to determine whether or
not to award fees in a particular case. I think those are
murky instructions and that the Court has left people in a
difficult position in deciding whether or not to bring suit.
238 Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
Zissu Let me ask this question about these. We have all these
other federal statutes. I've always been under the impres-
sion from my practice that attorney fee awards in copyright
cases are not that big a deal in terms of hearings, discovery
and having a whole trial on attorney's fees, whereas in the
anti-trust or the securities business, these things can get to
be quite complicated. Do you think that's going to change?
First of all, do you think it's true that copyright is a sort of a
shorter step-sister here? In other words, people put in fee
applications frequently on papers, they put in their bills,
people take a shot at it and maybe there is an argument in
court, maybe not, and a fee award comes down. Is that
going to change? First of all, do you agree that that is the
way it has been, and second, will it change or are we going
to encourage a second kind of a case that goes on in every
case?
Hamilton If Irwin is right that we have such a wide range of fee
discussions already in the federal courts it seems inevitable
that they're going to expand the fee decisions in copyright
cases now to meet those sorts of considerations. But I think
we're going to have a long time of courts feeling around
trying to figure out what criteria are important in the
copyright context.
Callagy I don't think that the procedure for determining a fee
application will change. I think it will be done on papers. I
think where it will get complicated is that most of the
complaints that you have these days not only have the
copyright claim, but they've got Lanham Act claims, they
have common law claims, and they've got the kitchen sink
thrown in. So that when you get to the fee applications, it is
going to be a big issue as to processing the claims, and as to
how much time was spent on a given claim and maybe
counsel fees are not awardable under various of the causes
of action. So I think it would get complicated in that regard.
Jones I think this is especially true if you look at the language that
the Court does take from the Topstone Industries decision
regarding compensation and deterrents. These contain
uncertain standards with respect to what factors should be
considered. It seems unlikely to me that there won't be a
substantial amount of litigation around those issues.
Supreme Court Roundtable 239
Karp I don't think you could get much more specific about the
factors. What are you going to do-prescribe hourly rates?
Then you have to appoint Herman Badillo a monitor to
make sure people actually are doing the work that they
claim in their fee schedules or time schedules. I think these
are fairly reasonable descriptions of the factors and probably
more could be developed, but, since, as Marsha points out,
the courts are always dealing with these questions and there
are no more specific guidelines in other areas of litigation. I
really think the important question is how many cases really
are going to be that difficult to categorize? The Denker
case, simple as pie. No question that they should have
awarded attorneys' fees. The Time Warner case where the
lawyer, what was that guy who did you in, your attorney,
where the District Court even awarded attorneys' fees to the
defendant? The defendant had made an offer, and the
judgement came in below the offer, and the defendant
consented to an injunction.
Sorkin This question that Irwin raises, leads me to wonder, as a
matter of history, whether there have been appellate rulings
on the exercise by lower courts of their discretion and
application of the factors?
Karp Yes. The Warner Brothers case I'm talking about went up to
the Second Circuit. In fact, they reversed and said even
though the plaintiff's attorney really should have been
sanctioned, there is no provision in the Copyright Act that
allows an award of attorneys' fees to a defendant who
technically hasn't prevailed, even though from a practical
point of view it had.
Sorkin But that's a very narrow and specific...
Karp That's one of many.
Sorkin But I'm talking about the kind of standards that I read out
of the lead citation. Have the courts dealt with that and
said that these various equitable standards that you believe
are so broad or are not in particular cases appropriate?
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Paul You have to start with the premise that (a) it is an abuse of
discretion standard on appeal and (b) in many of these
situations, cases settle out, rather than going through the
costs of an appeal. What I think is interesting about where
this whole discussion has led all of us collectively is that
we've gotten completely away from the obvious ruling of the
Court, which is that same standard applies to both plaintiff
and defendant, and we have instead focused on either a
perceived or an actual pre-existing lack of standards,
whether as applied to plaintiff or defendant. Before, there
were two different standards, one for plaintiff and one for
defendant. Now, we have the same amount of loosey-
goosiness, but it applies equally to both sides.
Zissu I am having more trouble figuring out what it will be for
defendants.
Curtis Whether the standard is a better one or not, I think it is less
clear now, at least on the plaintiff's side, because certainly
there were cases that said a prevailing plaintiff should
normally get attorneys' fees. Well, that gives you sort of a
presumption going in. Whether that's a good rule or not is
another matter. But I think it was a somewhat clearer rule.
I also wanted to add a little dissent to the notion that this
rule is likely to encourage defendants' standing up as a
matter of principle where they think they are clearly in the
right. It seems to me that even under the older rules, if you
were clearly in the right and you had a nutty plaintiff, the
defendant had a pretty good right to an award of fees. I
think the new rule might be more encouraging to defend-
ants, and I think it is intended to be more encouraging to
defendants, in the more evenly balanced case. A lot of what
comes through in this opinion is the fact that it is important
for the proper functioning of the Copyright Act that lines be
drawn through litigation as to the proper scope of copyright
protection, and therefore defendants should be free when
it's a legitimate matter of litigation and argument, they
should be free to defend the case without this terrible fear
that just because they lose by a little bit, they are going to
be stuck with attorney's fees.
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Zissu Can't we take one category, maybe to be a little provoca-
tive. Many plaintiffs have brought invalid claims over the
years, such as the misguided plaintiff who doesn't under-
stand that ideas are not protectable. We see it against
motion pictures, books. I think that's a whole area we could
probably say where attorneys' fees may start to be awarded
now, and, if that is so, is that a good thing? Is that a
category we could say, it's not bad faith, but you have this
misguided plaintiff. Is this a category?
Curtis I think clearly it's a good thing in that case.
Karp You've put a label on it before which is in the opinions-
objectively without merit, and I agree with Frank that it is a
good thing to discourage that type of suit.
Callagy I think what it really comes down to, and to courts haven't
spent a lot of time defining it, is who is the prevailing party?
Because again, to the extent that you have multiple causes
of action and while you might have no statutory claim for
misappropriation, you might have a common law claim, and
while you might be able to get beyond the motion stage
with the case, I think determination of prevailing party is
the area in which the Court has to focus. Is Fogerty realistic
about that, because if you win a dollar, you are not the
prevailing party when you've asked for 10 million dollars.
Paul That depends on what your object was in bringing suit. If
you're going for an injunction and you really care about the
injunction, and you get the injunction but you have not been
damaged or cannot prove damage, you have won and you
are the prevailing party in my book, even if your damages
are zero.
Callagy In my book you are, too. But if you went solely for money
damages and you wanted 10 million dollars in your ad
damnum clause and you got a dollar because you wanted
profits, to me you are not the prevailing party, but the
courts have not said that.
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Curtis I think that in some other areas, if not in the copyright area,
there is, I don't profess to be an expert on it, but there are
a certain number of decisions saying that if you have a
group of claims and there are some wholly distinct claims
that you don't prevail on, you don't get fees for that part of
the case. Often, of course, there are claims that are not
wholly distinct. In the area that we're talking about, where
you've got copyright, you've got unfair competition, you've
got maybe contract and quasi-contract claims, the fact that
you didn't fully prevail will be taken into account but in a
very general kind of way. That's a problem that runs across
all of these statutes where you have an award of attorneys'
fees. I'm no expert in civil rights cases but it is certainly
true in those cases. Somebody brings 20 different claims and
sometimes they're wholly distinct, sometimes they're related
and the courts have certain discretion to try to sort that out.
Zissu Let me just ask this question. What impact on any of us did
the dissent have? Justice Thomas is concerned about the
way statutes will be looked at, and I think he was saying the
Civil Rights Act should go the way the Copyright Act went.
Does that have any sway with anybody, or nobody cares
about it?
Curtis Isn't that really a question more for civil rights lawyers?
Which part of the opinion?
Zissu He's a new Justice. Do we want to comment on it?
Sorkin I'd like to go back to what Mr. Callagy said. I think I'm
troubled by your one dollar example, and if I understood
you right to say that in such a case the plaintiff would not
be deemed as prevailing party, assuming they sue for
damages.
Callagy No, I was saying in the case in question it was a suit over a
national advertisement. It was a suit for copyright infringe-
ment. But it also had claims for common law misappropria-
tion and Lanham Act violations. There, the plaintiff was
seeking very substantial damages for this ad which plaintiff
claimed had been copied from an earlier work of art that
she had executed.
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Paul I think that what Bob is alluding to is a situation in which
there is an exceedingly weak copyright claim but plaintiff is
awarded one dollar on it, yet clearly prevails on a compan-
ion Lanham Act claim. The Lanham Act only provides for
attorneys fees to the prevailing party in unusual circum-
stances. The question is whether a court is going to try to
sneak in through the back door of the copyright standard,
an attorneys' fees recovery that would not otherwise be
available under the Lanham Act standard.
Karp I don't think they can. Some judge may do it, but I think
the Supreme Court would knock it down.
Paul You're assuming it got up to the Supreme Court.
Karp Oh, I think it will get up. It may take time. This should
have been up before the Supreme Court 10 years ago.
Hamilton The Court at this point doesn't take anything unless there is
a clear circuit split. The Court views itself as a referee.
Their docket is down 35%; it is dramatic. So we can't rely
on the Supreme Court to solve these problems. If you want
a definition of "prevailing party," I don't think we should be
waiting around for the courts. It is Congress' responsibility.
Karp Having had a little experience with Congress writing
copyright laws, do you think that is really safer in the long
run than through patient waiting for the Supreme Court to
work it out?
Hamilton It depends on who's running the committees up on the Hill.
Karp Does it make any difference which of those people do it?
Hamilton I think it makes a tremendous difference. The question is
whether Congress is going to take responsibility for the
policy or whether it is going to defer all of its policy making
to private parties. I think it makes a big difference.
Paul I continue to maintain as a practitioner, that I would rather
go with the luck of the draw on a case-by-case basis, with
the discretion of the judge than have an arbitrary statement
of principles and rules that have to be distorted and twisted
to meet the facts of a particular case. I think that this is
exactly the kind of area in which judges need to have
discretion, need to exercise that discretion, and there is a
fair body of law that enables them to do just that.
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Jones I want to ask a question picking up on something that
Marcia said a little earlier about defendants being willing to
resist cases that they would not otherwise have been willing
to resist. Do you think that this case will produce a
substantive change in the behavior of entities involved in
using copyrighted materials? Will this affect who they will
pay when they are using the works of others? Is this just
going to have an effect on litigation? It seems to me that
the clear underlying thrust of the decision is people ought to
be able to use the things that are not protected by copyright
without fear of some unwarranted litigation. It seems to me
that many people in the copyright business are paying for
things out of fear of litigation, paying for licenses that need
not be purchased. Do you think that would change that
kind of substantive behavior?
Paul Potentially, yes, I think it would be a very slow change,
exceedingly slow change. But it would be interesting to see
in practice.
Sorkin I have a question connected to that. Maybe it is the same
question in a different way and that is does anybody see the
impact of this decision on the repeal of section 412? Is
there in anybody's view a connection between the two,
which I think is maybe the obverse of what you're asking or
maybe it is the same thing.
Karp One thing I think that it does in that connection is to cut
the little ground there was supporting the publisher's
meretricious argument that eliminating 412 will start a flood
of litigation. [laughter] This is the kind of speculation which
makes legislative drafting so speculative itself. The publish-
ers went in the past, before Congress to threaten that if they
enacted the Berne Act, we would have a flood of moral
rights litigation; and we haven't even had a trickle of that.
And they're arguing on 412 that if you eliminate the
requirement of registration prior to infringement, that that
will encourage enormous litigation, which it won't. And one
of the points that was made is that courts can award
attorneys' fees to defendants' lawyers. I pointed out that
one of the reasons it isn't as effective as it should be, is that
a lot of defendants' lawyers, as witnessed in the Uhry case,
are just not doing their job properly. They didn't ask for
attorneys' fees, that's what I mean by not doing their job
properly, and they should have done it.
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But the Fogerty decision certainly is going to make it harder
to argue that someone's going to try to make a fortune by
bringing a strike suit on an invalid copyright claim because
they think the defendant will settle rather than risk litigation
without collecting attorneys' fees. Now the defendant can
recover fees in that type of case, which I think encompasses
a lot of litigation. A lot of it I think is brought by people
who Bob described as nutty plaintiffs, with lawyers who
don't really perform their obligations and bring complaints
on works that are just not infringing at all. Morrison v.
Solomon is a great example.
Curtis I think one of the interesting questions, and I'm not in the
best position to answer it, is what effect this will have on
defendants in areas where there are hotly contested issues
about copyrightability and the extent of protection. I don't
do a lot of computer work, but I would love to have those
questions answered in that context. Certainly what the
Court is trying to achieve is to encourage defendants in
those cases that have reasonable positions to litigate out
those cases with greater frequency, maybe not so much on
the hope that they will get an award of attorneys' fees, but
with some of the fear taken away that they will get socked
with attorneys' fees as well as damages if they lose those
cases. Certainly the Court is trying to encourage those
defendants, but I would be interested in asking the people
who are doing a lot of that day by day what they think the
actual effect will be.
Karp Ask Roger. Assume you had registered, Harper & Row had
registered, The Memoirs, President Ford's Memoirs, before
Victor Navasky carved out an editorial column in The
Nation, do you think you would have gotten back attorneys'
fees? That was a hotly contested case.
Zissu In that case, I would. I think we probably would have.
Karp Do you think you would?
Zissu Yes. I don't think it would have been a big deal.
Karp What do you think, Marcia?
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Paul I think not, because I think that in my experience,
particularly in first impression kinds of cases, judges have a
tendency to say that was a close call; neither side brought
this in bad faith; it could have gone either way. In these
circumstances, even prevailing plaintiffs have not been
awarded attorney's fees, notwithstanding the so-called "pre-
sumption." So, my bet in the Nation case, would have been
no.
Zissu In Roth v. Pritikin I think there was an award of attorneys'
fees to the defendants. I think of Second Circuit held it an
abuse of discretion and reversed.
Karp Yes, I think you're right.
Zissu I think, taking into account all the factors in the litigation,
and the trial testimony, there was a reasonable chance that
in the exercise of discretion we might have gotten attorneys'
fees. But, the Second Circuit reversed anyway. So, I don't
know what would have happened to it as it wound its way
up to the top. I have a question, one question. It's kind of
a loaded question. Do you think if a defendant is
threatened with litigation for copyright infringement, let's
assume it's a close case, or it's a frivolous case, do you think
it's better for the defendant to seek a declaratory judgement
and be a plaintiff asking for attorneys' fees, or can the
defendant now feel just as comfortable seeking attorneys'
fees when it wins, having defeated the claim for copyright
infringement? In other words, I'm putting the ultimate
question to you.
Callagy Roger, I still think that you'll be better off as a plaintiff. I
think as a matter of practice, the Fogerty opinion will not be
a deterrent after a court speaks. I think where it works is
with pro se plaintiffs or marginal lawyers who don't really
know the area, taking on something that is not a great case.
I don't think they are going to take a gander with something
that is a long shot when defense counsel says, hey, you'd
better think about Fogerty before you file that complaint
because you could get nailed with an award of attorneys'
fees. That's the area in which I think it will have an
immediate effect. However, I don't know that it will have a
real effect down the road.
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Paul I just wanted to inject the practical note again, in part in
response to Irwin's comment about attorneys making mis-
takes by not seeking attorneys' fees. Part of the reason that
there is somewhat of the dearth of law in point and part of
the reason why we have not seen a lot of decisions on
point-even on the District Court level, not to speak of
going up-is that as a practical matter, lawyers usually want
to settle without appeal; they forego attorneys' fees or reach
some private agreement taking a nominal amount towards
attorneys' fees in settlement, simply to avoid the further
litigation costs. I'm sure there are some attorneys who
mistakenly fail to ask for attorneys' fees, but, by and large,
as a practical matter, it's cheaper to settle out.
Karp I agree with you, but there are reported decisions, such as
the Uhry decision, and others, I don't want to mention
them, because some of us have been involved in some of
them, where the party who lost really could have been
soaked for attorneys' fees on either side, and no demand
was made for them. Let me just give one example because
Bernie wasn't personally involved. The SUPERMAN case-
Time Warner against...
Paul 'The Great American hero?
Karp Time Warner against, yes.
Paul Didn't that get decided primarily on Lanham Act grounds?
Karp No, no. It was a copyright case.
Zissu ABC, it was copyright.
Karp Lanham was involved, but it was basically a copyright suit.
The guy, the young kid, wearing that kind of uniform was
clearly not an infringement of SUPERMAN. And it was a
very strong Second Circuit opinion on that, too.
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Curtis One thing that has to be borne in mind in thinking about
the deterrent effect when you're talking about the marginal
lawyer who doesn't know what he's doing, is that under the
Copyright Act I believe we're talking about an award
against the other party, against the plaintiff. I don't know
this for sure, but I don't think that the Copyright Act allows
you to get it from the lawyers. You still have to go back to
Rule 11 if you want to get it from the lawyer, which is
perhaps unfortunate because surely this is an area in which
the plaintiff who thinks that he's got a copyright infringe-
ment when it's really a theft of ideas, if he's not well
advised, it's an honest mistake. The person who we should
be getting at a lot more is the lawyer who doesn't know
what he should know before he brings such a suit.
Karp I think that if district court judges exerted themselves a little
more to police the calendar, as Bob pointed out, one of the
things they would do in the kinds of cases we're talking
about, because they're pretty obvious, some of them, right
from the beginning, is at pre-trial, raise the question very
directly. And also ask the attorney representing the party
that the judge thinks really hasn't got a chance to show the
judge a copy of the letter the attorney wrote to his client
warning his client about the danger of being assessed
attorneys' fees.
Paul Leaving the latter part of that out, Irwin, I do think that is
what the Initial Case Management Conferences are sup-
posed to be about, in the Southern and Eastern Districts
under the new scheduling order and plan. Those kinds of
issues are supposed to, at least in theory, be addressed
upfront by the court with parties present, without probing
attorney-client communications and demanding to see copies
of letters about such things.
Karp On the Sixth Circuit, they really have come that far almost
with the mini-trial, where the parties have to be present.
Jones I'm not sure that I agree with Karp's assessment of the
Warner Brothers v. ABC case. I don't see that case as such
a certain case that attorneys' fees ought to be awarded
against the defendant under this even handed provision.
Karp That's what makes for split decisions.
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Jones Well, I guess that also makes for what's troubling about the
Fogerty case. It is not clear what is going to follow from this
decision. This case is clearly affected by the unusual posture
of the case: the person who produced the musical composi-
tion was sued for infringing himself. That created some
considerable sympathy for that particular defendant.
Karp I don't think the facts of the case have anything to do with
it. I think the Court said here, we've got these conflicting
positions by the Circuits on how to interpret 505, and we
read 505 and there is nothing in there that allows a court to
give preference to plaintiff or defendant.
Zissu We'll learn that because this was remanded, I think. So
we'll learn what the district judge...
Jones Well, I think that insofar as you're talking about questions
of deterrence or compensation and what one means by those
terms, it is important that this case is about the author being
sued for infringing his own work.
Karp Authors have been sued for infringement of their own works
and have lost.
Callagy On remand, do you think one of the issues will be whether
and to what extent the parties had settlement discussions
before the case went to trial? Will the Court in deciding
whether it is appropriate to award counsel fees want to
know whether or not there was a reasonable dialogue?
Paul Don't you think there is a problem with that approach
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 408, a problem
with the Court inquiring into the substance or fact of
settlement negotiations whether pre-/or post-litigation?
Callagy Well, my feeling is to avoid an award of attorneys' fees, you
might want to show how unreasonable one side was in terms
of their demand or vice versa.
Paul If you do that then, you're getting in the way of another
underlying policy consideration, which is the policy favoring
and encouraging settlement and settlement negotiations.
Zissu Now we'll do an exit question the way McLaughlin does.
On a scale of one to ten, would those here prefer legislation
or a common law or case law development of the standards
for attorneys' fees? And we'll go right around the room on
the exit question. Sorkin?
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Sorkin I would prefer, with one caveat, case development. The
caveat being, I would, speaking from a parochial point of
view I must admit, like to see legislation which says that the
relative economic standing of the parties is not to be
considered.
Karp I would prefer to see it go to the case law route.
Curtis I would generally prefer to see it go the case law route,
because I'm pessimistic about Congress really coming to
grips with it specifically in the copyright context. If there
were to be a general change on the way we handled this-a
different choice between the American rule and the English
rule- I think you would almost necessarily have to involve
Congress, and maybe we'll come to that someday.
Callagy I believe in the case law approach.
Jones I think I'm sort of evenly divided at this point. It seems to
me that some clarity would be very useful and that for the
next few years it's going to be very difficult for people who
want to bring copyright suits. If some legislation were
possible, I would prefer that.
Hamilton I think predictability is probably the most important value in
these sorts of decisions. For that reason I think Congress
should take the responsibility and make a decision. I don't
think the courts are going to be able to come up with an
across the board rule, across the country, that will provide
predictability and fairness for all the parties.
Paul I'm emphatically in favor of the case by case approach,
because I don't think that this kind of discretionary standard
can be productively legislated.
Zissu The answer: Nine-case law, according to the McLaughlin
approach.
Karp Who is McLaughlin? Oh, I thought you meant the former
judge.
Zissu The McLaughlin Group is a group that discusses public
events on Sundays in various areas. They yell about it, it's
chaotic and I love it for that reason. My life is so normal
and reasonable that I love chaos on Sunday.
Campbell v. Acuff Rose
Anyway, I guess we'll go to the second decision. The
second decision is the parody decision, Campbell v. Acuff
Rose. I guess the first question we can start with is, what do
you think the big points are, are there a lot of points, and
what are the biggest points in this decision?
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Callagy I believe in collapsing the four fair use factors by basically
boiling them down to two. One is, what did you do to the
market for the work that has been infringed? Then really
the other three factors all seem to come back to the first
factor, what is the nature of the work?
Curtis I would say that to me that the two things that jump out the
most is the very strong endorsement of parody as legitimate
form of criticism standing almost in its own right. I think
what Bob said has to be limited to parody type cases. While
Judge Souter is careful to balance things out and say it could
be this, it could be that, still, the message that comes
through as far as parody is concerned, is, if it is primarily a
parody and if, in the judge's eyes, you don't use more than
you have to, you are maybe not 100% certainly, but almost
certainly, in the clear. The other biggest factor, I think, is
the strong emphasis on transformative use and the extent of
transformative use, and that I would think is the part of the
opinion that is likely to have the greatest impact outside the
parody field.
Karp I was taken by the definitional paradox. Richard Dannay
always talks about pastiche, and I always have to go back
and look up the definition which I promptly forget. But,
ironically, and the Court now quotes the same definition of
parody that I looked up this morning in Houghton-Mifflin's
American Heritage: "Parody is a literary artistic or artistic
work that broadly mimics an author's characteristic style and
holds it up to ridicule." This wasn't parody, this was really
pastiche. Pastiche is "a dramatic or musical piece openly
imitating the previous work of another artist, often with
satirical intent." I don't think that's critical, I think the
Court is simply going to say, oh well, you call parody a
pastiche, it's the same thing. But ironically, if it were true
literary parody, I don't think it would be infringement to
begin with, since it would only be copying the author's style,
and you can copy Hemingway's style all you want, as long as
you don't copy one of his books. But I agree with both Bob
and Frank about what I think is the probably the basic
impact. I think it weakens copyright protection quite
considerably in this area.
Paul You mean hi the parody context?
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Karp The Acuff decision itself. One more point, I think that the
Supreme Court in the past and whoever else, I guess it was
Nimmer, began talking about the effect of the market being
the most important factor in determining fair use, which was
grievously in error. I don't think fair use ought to be
determined primarily on that point. Because I can see uses
that I would think were outrageous non-fair uses that have
very little impact on the market value of a particular work.
Someone had copied a big chunk out of Henry Roth's "Call
It Sleep" while "Call It Sleep" was dormant between its
publication and its revival thirty years hence. I don't think
that should be considered fair use.
Sorkin Judge Leval, I think, made that point in a slightly different
way when he spoke of the unknown song that was given
huge fame and economic value by being without authoriza-
tion stuck into a movie. But I don't think it follows from
that, that the opposite is not true, that is if there is an
impact on the market it shouldn't be considered extremely
important.
Karp I agree.
Paul There are three things that I thought were critical. One was
how strongly the Court seemed to elevate parody and to
protect it. Second, as you say, the demotion of the fourth
fair use factor. My third point is that I think the Court went
out of its way-and did not have to-to get rid of the
presumption under the Sony case of the use being unfair if
it was commercial. They seem to be looking for a case to
undo what Sony had wrought, in that connection.
Zissu But they did it.
Curtis And that was a very welcome thing, wasn't it?
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Hamilton I agree. It seemed to me that the Court was looking for a
case to try to take back its statements in Sony and Harper &
Row about the first and fourth factors and to say that they
weren't determinative. This case certainly gave them the
opportunity because the lower court had such a shallowly
reasoned opinion. But what I took away from this case is
that if you compare it with Feist, the Court seems to have
placed itself in the role of being the policy maker for
copyright in the country. It seems to want to fill that role.
Which is why I find Fogerty so interesting because the Court
doesn't seem to want to fill that role at all in the particular
case. But in Feist and Acuff Rose it goes out of its way to
go beyond the statutory question on which certiorari was
granted on, which they could have answered directly,
decided the case and dropped the issue. In both cases, they
go into the uncharted territory of defining and requiring
creativity or originality or transformative uses. These are all
part of the same package. The Court seems to be charting
an extrastatutory aspect of copyright policy. And the
Members are doing it in unanimous opinions.
Jones There are a few things that I came up with on this. One is
the parody notion that everyone has talked about and
rejection of the "commercial" discussion in the Sony dicta.
What I also found interesting is that this case is consistent
with Fogerty's and Feist's view of using other people's works.
There seems to be a willingness in the Court to consider it
appropriate to use someone else's works. That tendency is
evident in each one of these cases. The aspect of the case
that I found most troublesome was the Court's unwillingness
to look at the musical questions that were raised. The Court
totally backed away from the music; gave no guidance on a
how to handle the music questions and sent it back for
remand. The record it had on the music was as strong as
the record it had on the written components. The Court
could have given some guidelines on how to evaluate the
music. It did not.
Curtis Isn't it simply the fact that we all know that most lawyers
are literary people? They deal with the written word all the
time, and they are usually quicker and more comfortable
making judgments about a book or a story than they are in
making judgments about a piece of music or art.
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Karp I would just like to ask Beryl, I couldn't get a fix, because I
didn't go back and read the lower court decision on how
much of the music really was taken. The Court's opinion
seems to suggest it was an opening riff and not much of
anything else.
Paul No, it was a very definite, sizeable taking. One which leads
to the whole issue of how much do you need to take and
the parody question. But it was clearly a very sizable taking
with frequent repetitions of the bar and parodying of the
lyrics and music throughout. I think that perhaps the reason
the Court didn't look at the musical questions, apart from
the fact that they are not musicians and perhaps the record
was not fully developed enough for them to do it, is that
they were reaching for a vehicle for fair use analysis for
some of the reasons we have discussed. I think that if you
get into the music aspects of it, the compulsory licensing
provisions change the fair use analysis in the music context
in ways which might not apply to other kinds of fair use
questions.
Hamilton That's interesting because that came up during oral argu-
ment of the case. They spent at least 10 minutes on it and
Justice Stevens was stuck on it: Why wasn't this a
compulsory licensing case and why couldn't they decide it
that way?
Karp What's compulsory licensing got to do with writing a new
composition and using somebody else's ...
Zissu Well, the Court, not being a specialty court, is not generally
versed in such matters. But is anything left of the Sony
decision, or is that now a sui generis case? In other words,
the commercial nature and the presumption from that is not
going to be a factor any longer, a major factor necessarily,
in analyzing the first and fourth fair use factors. Then you
have the transformative use which is inflated and given great
respect here, whereas in Sony, I think, there was even a
statement that a productive use is not necessarily dispositive.
"Productive," I am using interchangeably with "transforma-
tive." So Sony now has retreated to being this time-shifting
case, maybe involving privacy concerns about going into
people's houses to see what they're doing. Sony has been
greatly reduced. What do you think?
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Hamilton But Sony probably has terrific strength coming in the future
if all of our information is going to come over the
information superhighway into our homes. Even if all Sony
stands for is home use exception, that may include every
copying possibility in the world.
Zissu That may be plenty.
Hamilton It may be everything.
Zissu Good and plenty.
Curtis Certainly the case makes clear that you can't take that
phrase of the Sony case in isolation and apply it to cases
that involve what the Court regards as transformative uses
as opposed to a reproductive use. It seems to me that
common sense says that should always have been the case.
That emphasis on commercial versus non-commercial should
have been thought of primarily in the context of the Sony
case or perhaps in a context where you really had something
that was noncommercial in the sense of an educational use,
and that's a special factor. But in most cases the fact that it
is commercial in the sense that people are making money
shouldn't be an important factor.
Zissu Is parody too narrowly defined?
Paul It has several definitions.
Zissu It has several definitions but they all come back to, in one
degree or another, relating it to some comment on the first
work. Is that too narrow?
Karp Semantically, all they had to do was say parody or pastiche
and they would have covered the subject by dictionary
definition. There have been a lot of parody cases, so we
know what the courts are talking about when they talk
about parody.
Sorkin Irwin, I think if you would look to one or two other
dictionaries, you would find definitions that encompass both
uses.
Karp Yeah, but they used my dictionary. They quote it. [laugh-
ter]
Zissu Let's assume they use pastiche for parody.
Sorkin I want to express a view on your question. I don't think it's
too narrowly defined, and I think for this kind of case, at
least, or at least in a copyright context, the notion ought to
be limited to commenting on the work which is allegedly
infringed rather than on society at large or...
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Callagy I believe that the Court has narrowly defined, too narrowly
defined it. In fact, one of the things that has struck me
about this is the Court really slaps commercial speech, that
is, they say on page 4174 that if the use, for example, of the
copyrighted work was for advertising, even in a parody, this
will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of
the fair use inquiry. I am reminded that in New York Times
v. Sullivan, we were dealing with an advertisement. And yet
here the Court slaps down a parody to the extent it is going
to be used in an advertisement. There was a recent case in
California that will never get to the Supreme Court
involving Vanna White and a print ad. She sued over a
robot wearing a blond wig claiming that the ad was
conjuring up an idea of Vanna White.
Paul I think, Bob, you're assuming that parody has to have the
same definition for Section 43(a) or trademark purposes as
it does for copyright purposes. And I don't think that is
necessarily true. Granted, a dictionary is a dictionary is a
dictionary, but, I think the scope of what is entitled to
parodic protection for trademark purposes or unfair compe-
tition purposes should by definition be broader than that
protected for copyright purposes.
Karp In taking what Beryl says about music, I think that the
Court has gone much too far in defining how much has to
be taken. First of all, I looked at the lyrics and I don't think
that's commentary on anything. I think they went for a ride
on the music. And I don't think you really can parody
music all that much. You don't have to take a lot to
comment on it. I think if they took as much as they say you
did, I think the Court simply has opened the door to alot
more infringement on the part of the defendant.
Jones I didn't say that. Marcia Paul said that. I don't care about
the amount that was taken. I don't think there was too
much taken.
Karp I'm only referring, I asked you, and you said there was quite
a bit of music taken. You talked about repeating the riff
and there was other things.
Jones No. Marcia said that.
Karp It really doesn't make any difference to me who said it.
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Jones But, be that as it may, it seems to me that if you're going to
do a parody of a song and you want to call to mind this
song, that you may have to take a portion of the music. The
music is the song, especially if it's a popular song. The
music and the words have to work together. Separating
them in ways the Court has done seems to me to be an
artificial act.
Karp I forget which Supreme Court decision had another factor in
determining the fair use which was did the user make the
original author really a co-author of the second work?-and
if he did, that's not fair use. And that's exactly what I think
is happening here. The group is using the first group's music
not just for parody but because that music helps sell their
songs.
Paul You're arguing in effect that it's a derivative work...
Karp It is a derivative work.
Paul ... and unlicensed. I think that there was a large amount of
taking, but I do not believe that it was a derivative work.
Callagy I agree with Beryl Jones that you had to take that amount
to create the parody. One question I have for Beryl Jones is
what happens on remand if the copyright holder now says
that I'd like to license a parody. Remember earlier, when
approached, they said they wouldn't do it. For the purposes
of the remand, what happens if they say "we've changed our
mind and we now feel that this is the greatest parody
potential going."
Jones Or even to license a rap version it seems to me that if you
can't, if this doesn't fly, I don't see how you can do a
parody rap of "Oh, Pretty Woman."
Paul What doesn't fly? I don't understand you.
Jones If 2 Live Crew's use of this song doesn't withstand scrutiny,
how can you do a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" in a rap
version? I think there's a difference between taking such
student reviews and musicals, in which popular songs by
chance are utilized in the music. There the music can be
any popular music. The words are not connected with the
music. That is different from what 2 Live Crew did. Here it
was the music and the words that are connected together. I
don't think you can do their parody without the music. The
parody falls short without the music.
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Paul The parody would not have been as good without as much
taking. But my problem is not a problem with the law as it
has developed and what they've said: it's outcome-determi-
native. I think the amount of taking was more than need
be, but I don't think the amount of taking was so excessive
as to render it an unfair use. However, I do believe that
because the taking was greater than it needed to be,
defendants have totally obliterated the potential market-
the fourth factor. I guess the facts will be developed on the
record on remand, but I cannot fathom the later licensing of
a derivative rap work, given both the success and the
amount of taking of the 2 Live Crew version.
Hamilton What I don't understand, if that's true, and I actually agree
with you, is why should it be fair use then? Why shouldn't
it be one of those cases where we might not permit an
injunction but we would permit damages? It doesn't seem
to me that justice has been served if you're going to take
that much and it's going to be taken completely for free.
Paul The only rejoinder I have to that is what Beryl said which is,
it would have been a lousy parody had they taken less. It
still, in my judgment, would have been parody, but it
wouldn't have been as good.
Hamilton But it would have been just as good if they paid for some of
it.
Paul Well, but they tried to pay for it which...
Hamilton That's contested in the record.
Paul In so many of these cases the mere fact that there was an
approach made, winds up dictating the result.
Curtis Well, it's not emphasized in the opinion. There's certainly a
footnote in the opinion that suggests that no injunction but
some damages is an appropriate outcome in some cases.
Zissu Maybe this raises the question again, maybe the definition
of parody is too tight. Maybe you should have a little
breathing room to make a better parody, more than to have
a minimal raising or conjuring up of-the original work.
Paul They're saying that this is a parody under what you're
terming a "narrow definition." So I don't understand why
you want to broaden the definition of parody.
Zissu No, what I mean is, instead of limiting the amount of taking
in the parody-it's a use for parody, but if you make it a
better parody, if you go beyond, maybe you have excessively
used, but maybe that liberality should be allowed.
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Paul Perhaps in a case like this you don't need to make it more
liberal. But I'm troubled by a case such as the Air Pirates
case where the court said that they needed to make the
Mickey Mouse figures look less like Mickey Mouse. I don't
understand that. It seems to me there that there is no
reason to insist that the illustrator alter the Mickey Mouse
figure in some way in order to be entitled to protection as
parody. There's no change in the effect on the market,
whether it's a better rendition of Mickey Mouse or not-
and it makes it a better parody.
Zissu Wouldn't Air Pirates maybe have been decided a little
differently today? Do you think Air Pirates was affected by
being a little scatological in another period, twenty years
ago, almost, whereas that's not a factor in the Roy Orbison
song parody?
Sorkin I'm just wondering, a question for Professor Jones, whether
you're suggesting that the fourth factor is a sine qua non,
that there has to be a showing of damage to the copyright
owner before you find infringement.
Jones Oh no. It does seem to me that you need to look at the
first factor and see what the purported use is. There are
kinds of reproductions or uses which I would not agree are
not permitted fair uses-regardless of whether there's
market effect. Or are you limiting your question to parodies
in particular?
Sorkin No. Are you looking on the Air Pirates situation as a
parody situation?
Jones Yes.
Sorkin And what do you think is being parodied there?
Jones I think they were parodying the image of Mickey Mouse as
a particular personification of the American ideals of purity
and sweetness. They were parodying Mickey Mouse and
American cultural ideals.
Sorkin And you don't believe I take it that that could be done
effectively absent of total replication of Mickey Mouse?
Jones I see no reason to demand that the artist not reproduce the
Mickey Mouse figure accurately. I don't see what difference
it makes whether or not it's an accurate rendition of Mickey
Mouse or Mickey Mouse whose ears are slightly askew.
What difference does that make with respect to the market
effect?
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Sorkin Well, we come back to what I perceive to be your view, that
there has to be a market effect. Isn't it enough for the
copyright owner to say: "This is my property and it's not to
be reproduced." It's one of the rights the copyright owner
has, irrespective of market effect.
Jones No, because I've limited my comments to parodies. I am
not arguing that reproductive uses which are not parodies, if
they have no market effect, are outside of the protection of
copyright.
Karp What bothers me is that I think that if we are worried about
lack of definition of the area of attorneys' fees, we ought to
be trebly worried by lack of definition here, because I don't
think the Supreme Court knows anything and has not really
made any decision about what really constitutes parody in
the case of music. I'm talking about the music, because here
you realize, as I was saying to Frank, you had a work that is
really two works: a musical composition accompanied by a
set of lyrics.
Really, if anything, they would be trying to parody the lyrics
which are much more susceptible to social comment. I don't
think that music lends itself that role in a parody. If you
have to copy half of a piece of music in order to parody it, I
think there is something wrong with the definition of
parody-if it's allowed as a parody. It's not just a
suggestion of the work and then you comment on its style or
whatever musical philosophy there is, and so forth. In this
case I think what probably happened is they wanted to use
the music because this was very attractive commercial,
marketable music, and they wrote for themselves a new set
of lyrics which were different and tacked it on to the
copyrighted music.
Paul I think the problem with that analysis, Irwin, is that,
granted, there were two separate sets of rights, the copyright
in the lyrics and the copyright in the melody. But the
parody was not a parody of either the lyrics or the melody.
The parody was a parody of the song. And the song is both.
And you needed to take both and take from both in order
to create a recognizable, good parody. The question is, how
much did you need to take?
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Karp Marcia, let me put this hypothetical: suppose that the
recording had been without the lyrics. Most popular songs
these days that are recorded repeatedly (at least the
standards, such as the Irving Berlin song that was subject to
parodies) probably are recorded and performed more with-
out lyrics than with lyrics. Suppose they had performed the
Orbison song without lyrics. Just performed their version of
it without lyrics. Would that be a parody of Orbison's song?
Paul No, not in my opinion.
Karp Not in mine either, because what the heck comment were
they making about the music itself?
Paul But, on the other hand, if they had simply written a parody
of the lyrics and put it to totally different music, it wouldn't
be a parody of this song.
Karp Well that's tough luck. There's nothing in the Constitution
that says everybody has to have a right to parody.
Curtis I think it's sort of artificial to talk about, even though in
legal terms there may be two copyrights involved here.
Karp No. Frank, I'm talking artistically. I'm talking about what I
hear on records everyday because I listen to tapes and
records and I listen to songs without the lyrics.
Curtis Unless you're going to limit parody to printed works,
Karp No I'm not.
Curtis You have to allow people to use some of the music. I
haven't heard these songs, so I can't speak to the question
of how much is too much and whether you could have done
a reasonable parody just using the music of the first line or
something like that. But the way people, the way the public
gets a song is not in the form of two separate copyrights. It
gets the song with music and lyrics and unless you are going
to prohibit people from doing performed parodies of songs,
you have to allow some use of music. Yes, it is possible in
some context like in the Mad Magazine case that you might
just deal with lyrics, but in the case of performed parodies
you're going to involve, it's going to normally involve some
of both.
Karp Given again the fact that despite your statement that we
hear both, in many types of popular music you never hear
the lyrics. All you hear is the music being played, and I
want to know, want the Court to tell me, what constitutes a
parody of music without lyrics. I doubt that there's very
much room for parody in music.
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Jones I don't think that's true, actually. I think there are a
number of ways that you can make comments about a
musical composition without using the lyrics. In fact, most
of the music in rap compositions is, in fact, a use of music
which comments on the duplicated music of another work.
Through that duplication the composition makes a statement
about the other performance, either a political statement,
social statement or a referential statement. I certainly think
it can be done. I don't think that is what was done in the 2
Live Crew piece. There the music was employed simply to
enable the listener to understand what the words parodied.
The average consumer of the "Oh, Pretty Woman" song
hears both; it's certainly possible to separate them but the
average consumer hears both.
Karp The Times Style and Entertainment section had an article
about Spike Jones. I remember Spike Jones. Every record-
ing he ever made was parody, at least in the Supreme
Court's definition of the song he was recording. He loused
it up with gun shots, with all sorts of nonsense. You laughed
at what he was doing to the music, but he was performing
somebody else's copyrighted music, and under this defini-
tion, he probably could have gotten away without paying a
performance fee on the ground that he was performing a
parody. I don't think he should have.
Sorkin How would you understand that to be a commentary?
Karp I don't.
Sorkin You yourself say "loused up."
Karp He made more of a commentary. He was pointing up the
mawkishness of a lot of popular music.
Zissu I've heard jazz renditions of classical music. I've heard of
Beethoven or Vivaldi or a Bach sonata put to a rock beat.
Karp Is that a parody?
Paul What about PDQ Bach?
Zissu I think it can be.
Karp No, that's different. That's different music. He writes his
own stuff, and it's not really comment for Bach.
Zissu I think it's a humorous comment, making fun of the style of
another era and comparing it to today. So, I think it would
qualify as a parody.
Karp But if they did a performance of a William Schumann
quartet or Aaron Copland in jazz style, would that be a fair
use because it was a commentary?
Zissu It could be. It could be. You would have to hear it.
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Curtis I think there is certainly something to Justice Kennedy's
comment that this can all become a little bit too easy, which
is the point you're making. It's always easy to say "Well I'm
mocking the pretensions of the original." Well, "always"
may be an overstatement. But sometimes it is a little bit too
easy, and I'm not sure how we deal with that concern, but it
certainly is a legitimate continuing concern when we talk
about this parody.
Karp There is probably a small handful of people who are
sufficiently musically attuned to understand the literature, so
to speak, of what we are hearing. When one reads or hears
the lyrics of "Oh Pretty Woman," he can catch on to it.
Curtis So you are saying the average listener is going to hear it as
equivalent, even if the more sophisticated listener might
understand it as a comment?
Sorkin Either as an equivalent or as loused up, as Irwin suggests,
but not necessarily as a commentary of any kind for good or
Jones Are you therefore saying that a sophisticated parody is not
possible? It is only possible to make a parody that appeals
to the lowest common denominator in our culture?
Karp The Second Circuit said that a long time ago, the "ordinary
observer."
Jones Well, but I think there is some serious criticism of that test.
Sorkin I am not suggesting that at all, and I think that would be a
terrible limitation on what a parody should do. It's just that
it increases or aggravates the difficulty of determining
whether it's a parody or simply a taking. I guess it's expert
testimony.
Curtis It's also emphasizing the fact that, as the Court itself makes
clear, sometimes these things function as both. And maybe
the intention is mixed as well, that to some extent there may
be an element of parody in what they are setting out to do
and what they are being perceived to do, but there also may
be a big element in which they just decided to do a version
of the song and they think that people will remember the
song and enjoy the song.
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Paul On the other hand, I would be very troubled, and I think
the Court goes out the way to say this is not the case, if
there were a necessity that there be social satire in order for
something to be a parody. I don't think it has to have social
satire. I think in this particular case, this particular song was
both social satire and a parody. But, I think that it would
be much too limiting to require social satire before you find
parody.
Sorkin Excuse me. I think this raises a kind of tree falling in the
forest kind of question when nobody is there.
Zissu On that point, I have a question for you.
Sorkin It may be apparent only to the artist that there is a parody.
If no listener can be aware of it simply because of the high
sophistication involved, is it a parody? And does it serve a
social purpose?
Zissu Is anybody suggesting that we should have surveys? [laugh-
ter]. That we will have a survey to find out what the
average, ordinary observer would perceive as to whether it's
a parody or it's a serious statement?
Jones The Court does say something about a defense of parody
includes a determination as to whether the parodic character
may be reasonably perceived. I think that's a reasonable
way to look at it.
Hamilton This discussion makes me feel less sanguine about the
opinion than I was before. And the reason is because it
seems that what we are talking about is a parody defense.
There is no parody defense. Even if something is a parody,
one still must satisfy the other four factors. The real
problem with the transformation task is that it does lead
people to start thinking in terms of, well, if something is a
parody, it has strong social use, therefore, it is likely to be
fair use. But I don't think it is going to be fair use, unless
the use satisfies all the other factors, especially how much
was taken. I think there are plenty of parodists, even that
don't take a lot, who should be required to pay for the
portion that they have taken.
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Callagy I had the treat of listening to both versions, and I must say
that one of the saving features in terms of the 2 Live Crew
version, was that the lyrics were so outrageous, and had they
not gone as far as they went, in terms of their social
commentary, they might have had a lot more trouble at the
Supreme Court level than they did. My feeling is the Court
says that even if you take the expressive heart, which clearly
they did, that is not the end of the ball game. That as long
as you have achieved or fit within the definition of parody,
you are going to be all right, subject, or course, to remand.
Karp Bob, how close was the melody, forgetting the lyrics?
Callagy It was amazingly close.
Jones I am not sure that's an accurate account. If you listen
carefully to the music, what they've taken is the same
component in the music that they took in the lyrics.
Karp That's impossible.
Jones They took the clearly identifiable riff and they play it over
and over again, as is often the case with rap music. I might
be wrong on this point, but I think that's why it sounds so
similar.
Zissu I heard them played. I thought they took, at least to an
ordinary observer, namely, myself, a substantial amount of
the music, or what was attractive in the "Oh Pretty Woman"
music.
Jones They do.
Zissu It took me a couple of bars or couple of verses to really
hear the parody. But I did hear it, eventually. I thought it
was, I agreed with a lot of things the Supreme Court says,
but I still think there is an issue as to whether it is too
much. I don't know how that will come out.
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Curtis Responding to one of the comments before, I think that it is
a parody defense. While the Court goes out of its way to
say that you have to go through the four factors, what
emerges from the opinion, as far as I can see, is that if it is
really a parody, and if you don't take more than what the
judge thinks you need to take, then they plainly say that the
second factor, if I have my numbering right, is of very little
use in parody cases. So the only further consideration, and I
think the presumption is strongly in the plaintiff's favor
going into it, the only remaining consideration is if the
plaintiff can show that there is going to be a serious
economic harm. But apart from that sort of case, and
maybe in this case they can show that it is going to hurt
their licensing of "straight rap versions," whatever that
might be. But apart from that possibility, it seems to me
that we really do have a parody defense here.
Hamilton I disagree. Can I read from the case?
Curtis Oh, I know what it says.
Hamilton "The fact that parody can claim legitimacy for some
appropriation does not, of course, tell either parodist or
judge much about where to draw the line.., that any
parodic use is presumptively fair has no more justification in
law or fact than the equally hopeful claim that any use for
news reporting should be presumed fair." (citations omitted)
Curtis Right. But if it is apparent...
Hamilton It's just part of the preamble. Parody has just been added
to the preamble then. The Court has not ameliorated the
four factors in the fair use context.
Curtis That's perfectly legitimate to add it to the preamble.
Hamilton Why?
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Curtis Because the way the Court defines parody, it is a form of
comment and, only to the extent it is a form of comment is
it going really be treated as parody. Otherwise, it is a satire
of some sort, and you are into a more general fair use
comment analysis. But if it really is parody, the Court says,
well, the first factor is in the defendant's favor and the
commercial/non-commercial use is unimportant, so you win
on number one. On the second one, the nature of the work,
the Court has said it doesn't do the plaintiff any good. The
third one comes to whether you have used more than you
should have. And I think the only thing that really leaves in
the plaintiff's court, is coming in and making a strong
showing on the fourth one. Apart from that, despite the
preamble, I read the opinion as giving you a parody defense.
Hamilton You left off the second half of the opinion, though, which
relies so heavily on Bill Patry and Shira Perlmutter's article.
That part of the opinion says that there ought to be an
equitable rule of reason analysis done on a case-by-case
determination, like it has always been. If what you are
saying is true, then this case should not have cited to them
at all, instead of citing to them six times.
Callagy Did you think they had to send it back for remand?
Hamilton Yes. But I think Campbell likely will have to pay.
Zissu I have one question for you. At least I thought one point
was clear. Need we be concerned about asking for permis-
sion when we are considering a parody or another poten-
tially fair use? Or has this been put to rest by the comment
of the Court on permission? There was, you know, the
dichotomy, I think in Roy Export, on the Charlie Chaplin,
the usage of Chaplin films. The defendant was condemned
for being refused permission, having asked, but in Maxtone-
Graham, in the Second Circuit, I think Judge Kaufman said
it was reasonable to ask for permission just as a precaution.
In Campbell v. Acuff, I think the Supreme Court said it is
not to be held against the defendant.
Callagy Yet, in Campbell v. Acuff they said that was the one factor
that hurt the defense. They had gone for permission.
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Jones The Court says as a matter of law it doesn't matter. It
seems to me that, in fact, since this is an area in which the
subjective judgments of the decision makers is important, I
think, it will depend on what the judge feels. If the judge
feels that asking is important, it will still be important,
regardless of whether the Supreme Court says it is. It just
won't be a line in the opinion.
I think it shouldn't matter one way or the other. Often the
request concerns an assessment of the cost of litigation and
not the merits of the claim.
Paul As a practitioner, I have a problem with how I advise a
client on whether to ask or not, and I don't think the
Supreme Court decision helps me at all. I still believe that
if you believe you have got a strong shot at parody, you are
better off not asking. I mean, across the board, not just in
the copyright context, but in the trademark and unfair
competition context as well.
Zissu What about anonymously asking? [laughter]
Sorkin What about asking and surrounding your request with
cautionary language, would that help? Would that solve...
Paul You mean: "I know I don't really need to ask your
permission, but just because I want to be a nice person
Callagy Having tried these cases, and having had the issue of the
request, I would always prefer not to have the request there.
Karp Well, in this case, did they offer to pay? That's a big
difference, just asking for permission and saying I would like
your permission and I am willing to pay so much.
Paul If they got permission it would have been a mechanical
license, or...
Karp Well, but that's still payment.
Zissu Let me ask Bob Callagy this. Do you still...
Sorkin Let me react to what Mr. Callagy said. I can't disagree with
you, of course, because I don't have the history. But it just
seems to me bad social policy for a legal regime to develop
where it wipes out the possibility of resolving something like
this by a request for permission, which might be granted.
Zissu Asking Bob Callagy, do you still feel that way after this
decision?
Callagy I do, yes.
Jones I agree with Bernie that I think it is a bad idea to
discourage people from asking permission.
Supreme Court Roundtable 269
Karp I agree with Bernie too, because it isn't just money, it could
resolve it by saying take a little less. If you take a little, I'll
give you permission. That could have ended the problem.
Callagy How about legal fees in this case?
Karp No legal fees.
Paul We know Fantasy v. Fogerty is the standard, but we don't
know which side won yet.
Jones I have a question about Campbell v. Acuff Rose. What is
the collective sense of Kennedy's concurring opinion? Do
you think that his characterization of the majority is an
accurate characterization of the majority's opinion? He says
the parody must target the original and not its general style
or the genre of art to which it belongs or target society as a
whole. He says if it targets the original, it may, however,
target those features as well, citing the Koons decision. I
think that Justice Souter's opinion is inconsistent with that
interpretation.
Curtis I think that, plainly, Justice Kennedy is trying to give a
narrower spin to the opinion than the opinion itself would
lend itself to.
Zissu I agree with that, because Justice Souter's opinion is a little
less clear on that, and I think that Justice Kennedy is
concerned about it.
Karp I think Kennedy's opinion, especially the last page, is very
good. I think it is much more realistic in appraising what
constitutes parody in a case of music. It gives an example of
a jazz version of Beethoven's Sonata and so forth. I think
he knows more about music than apparently Justice Souter
does. Maybe in that little log cabin up there, he doesn't
listen to much music, certainly. But I ask another question?
Was anybody at the argument?
Hamilton Yes.
Karp Did the Court hear the music?
Hamilton No. Both parties came prepared to play it, but they did not
air it.
Jones Did they have the music available for them to listen in their
chambers?
Karp They watch dirty movies when they decide pornography.
[laughter]. Except for Justice Black, I think, he never
watched. Some of the others loved it.
Callagy I have a question. What's going to happen on remand? Will
the defense prevail?
Karp I am not so sure.
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Hamilton I don't think so.
Zissu My feeling is that it is going to be tough. There is a chance
that it could, but I think where we started out, Bob, was
your remark about collapsing these factors a little. I think a
lot of these factors do get collapsed. The commercial aspect
of it is not going to weigh in; and then the nature of the
copyrighted work, the second factor, didn't seem to both the
Supreme Court; and then they looked at the amount-of the
taking in terms of what was appropriate for the parody, and
that didn't seem to concern them; and they don't feel that
the use of a parody which merely criticizes and hurts the
market for the plaintiff's work in that way is significant. So
you are left with this issue of the effect of the parody on the
licensing of this music for straight rap or other kinds of uses.
And I think that is a very difficult burden for the plaintiff to
carry when he goes back.
Paul Reacting both to Roger's comment and to Frank's, I don't
think you can divorce the third and the fourth factors. I
think they may be saying that in and of itself, this is not too
much of a taking not to qualify for protection as a parody,
but I think there is a whole open ball game as to whether
this is too much of a taking to have an impermissible impact
on the market or the potential market for the work. While
the message of the Court may be that you need to take
more in order to have a good parody, I don't read Souter's
opinion as saying that you don't revisit the issue all over
again of how much of the taking there has been, in order to
reach a determination of the fourth factor. I think the
problem is going to be if the testimony is, as has been
suggested, that as a result of this parody there is no market
or potential market for a rap derivative version of the song,
and if the conclusion is that there could have been less of a
taking and still it would be a parody, the defendant may
really have a problem.
Zissu But if you had to bet on that, do you still think that has
been made more difficult by this opinion than it was before?
Paul Anything would have been better than the way it was
before.
Jones Do you think that the 2 TWo Live Crew is likely to prevail?
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Zissu I think they are likely to prevail. I think there is a chance
they could lose. But I think it's a tough-they are going to
compare Roy Orbison, what was the market for Roy
Orbison's song for derivative works of the rap straight
variety in the last twenty years-and that would be looked
at against the claim that they had an area of licensing
foreclosed.
Jones Do you mean that they have to have someone come on the
stand and testify that but for 2 Live Crew version, they
would have done a rap rendition?
Zissu No, not necessarily, but they have to do something.
Callagy They are going to have an expert come now and say that the
rap market has expanded dramatically and that there is a
real likelihood that the 60's songs are going to lend
themselves to phenomenal rap in the next ten years and that
this song, and then talk about the musical riff, lends itself
for the following reasons. You can collapse so many words,
so many ideas into this song. They will have testimony that
will establish that the market has been damaged for this
song.
Hamilton Which will mean that 2 Live Crew will lose.
Callagy My own thinking is on remand, that that's a possibility.
Paul Don't you think they are going to settle?
Karp I think the fourth factor is a lot of nonsense here. Music
doesn't destroy itself. What was the song in the termination
clause case, "Who's Sorry Now"? There were 419 record-
ings of "Who's Sorry Now", and no one of them prevented
the other 418. They are going to have a tough time if they
have to comply with the standard that you have to show real
damage to the market. There won't be any damage to the
market, but it's an infringement nonetheless. One of the big
problems with the whole fair use problem now is the
overemphasis on the fourth factor. Plus the nonsense of
saying he prevailed on one, the other side prevailed on-
what if it comes out two to two? Does that mean which
way do you decide?
Zissu Let's end on this note. If that happens, there will be extra
innings. Then the question is, how many versions of "Oh
Pretty Woman" can we take?
Karp 500, or at least 419.
Zissu Thank you.
